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Why Does China Attract So Little 
Foreign Direct Investment? 
Shang-Jin Wei 
“China fever” has been a phenomenon of the 1990s. In 1995, 
the last year for which definite figures are available, China 
received more foreign direct investment than any country 
except the United States. 
-Economist,  1 March 1997, 38, U.S. edition 
Headline: China Projects Another Record Investment Year; 
European, Japanese, U.S. Firms Top List 
The world’s strongest magnet for overseas investment is pro- 
jecting another record tally for 1996, even though the number of 
project approvals will be lower than in the previous year. 
-P.  T. Bangserg, Journul of Commerce, 21 December 1996,3A 
8.1  Introduction 
“China fever” and “the world’s strongest magnet for overseas invest- 
ment” are but  two phrases  one reads often  in the media that  describe 
the supposed euphoria that international investors have about investing in 
China. While the recent Asian financial crisis has reduced the official fore- 
cast somewhat on how much foreign direct investment (FDI) will go into 
China in 1998, it remains an attractive host for FDI. Or so the press will 
lead you to believe. 
This paper has two objectives. First, it will  show that contrary to the 
impression one gets from the popular media, China continues to be an 
underachievev, rather than an overachiever, as a host of direct investment 
from the world’s major source countries (e.g., the United States, Japan, 
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Germany, the United Kingdom, and France). Most of the high volume of 
inward FDI comes from unusual source economies such as Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Macao, and Singapore. 
Second,  the paper  will  examine whether  corruption  by  government 
officials, the excessive burden of regulation, and other institutional charac- 
teristics may have contributed to the relatively low volume of inward FDI 
from the major source countries. 
In an earlier (1996) paper using data from the United Nations Council 
of Trade and Development, I fitted a linear regression on direct investment 
during the 1987-90  period from the world’s five largest source countries 
to a number of host countries and compared China’s actual reception of 
FDI with its potential as predicted by the regression. Based on that meth- 
odology, I found that FDI in China was significantly below its potential, 
in both an economic and a statistical sense. 
A number of factors could explain that finding. First, given that China’s 
opening to foreign investment started relatively late (from 1980) and that 
the Tiananmen Square incident temporarily diminished FDI over 1989- 
90, 1987-90  may not be a good period by which to judge China’s appeal 
as a host country. FDI in China has grown exponentially recently. For ex- 
ample, total FDI in China in 1993 was between five to eight times that in 
1990 (see table 8.1 below). 
Second, the linear specification with the logarithm of FDI as the depen- 
dent variable excludes all source-host country pairs that have zero FDI. 
This could bias the results to exaggerate the potential amount of FDI that 
China could receive. 
Third, while the earlier paper examined host country size, level of devel- 
opment, and relationship with the source country as determinants of FDI, 
it neglected the importance of business environment, particularly the ex- 
tent of corruption by government officials in the host country. Recent pa- 
pers by Hines (1995) and Wei (1997a, 1997b) have suggested that severe 
corruption in  a host country could  significantly deter foreign investors 
from investing in the country. 
The current paper seeks to advance our understanding of FDI in China 
in a number of ways. We will use more recent data with more source coun- 
tries, that is, bilateral stock of direct investment in 1993 from the OECD. 
We will employ a modified Tobit specification that takes into account pos- 
sibly zero FDI in certain source-host country pairs. And we will explicitly 
examine whether corruption has deterred FDI. 
The paper is organized in the following way.  Section 8.2 reviews the 
recent trend in FDI in China and the source country composition of the 
FDI. Section 8.3 looks into the questions of whether China has attracted 
enough FDI from the world’s major source countries and whether corrup- 
tion has impeded the FDI in a significant way. Section 8.4 concludes. Why Does China Attract So Little Foreign Direct Investment?  241 
8.2  Foreign, Quasi-Foreign, and False-Foreign Direct Investment 
8.2.1  The Overall Picture 
The transformation of China from a country with virtually no foreign 
investment before 1979 to “the world’s strongest magnet for overseas in- 
vestment” is remarkable and has been well documented. 
In  Chinese statistics,  two notions  of  FDI are used: the contractual 
amount and the realized value. The contractual amount is  the amount 
that investors plan to invest over a period of time at the time of applying 
for approval for investment. The actual or realized value is not bound by 
the contractual amount and indeed is typically much smaller. Because be- 
ing able to attract foreign investment is often counted to the credit  of 
local officials by their superiors, government officials have an incentive to 
encourage foreign investors to overstate the (not legally binding) contrac- 
tual amount. For this reason, all data on FDI in this paper refer only to 
realized values. 
Table 8.1 exhibits the trajectory of the realized flow of FDI going into 
China every year from  1983 to 1998 (estimated amount) as reported by 
the China State Statistics Bureau. The growth is truly exponential: total 
inward FDI flow was a mere $0.64 billion in 1983. It grew to $3.19 billion 
in 1988, to $27.52 billion in 1993, and to $41.7 billion in 1996. Every year 
Table 8.1  Realized FDI in China: Annual Flows, 1983-98  (hillion US. dollars) 
Year  Annual Flow 
1983  0.64 
1984  1.26 
1985  1.66 
1986  1.88 
1987  2.31 
1988  3.19 
1989  3.39 
1990  3.49 
1991  4.37 
1992  11.00 
1993  27.52 
1994  33.77 
1995  37.52 
1996  41.73 
1997  37.OOa 
1998  37.OOa 
Source: China State Statistics Bureau, Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China statistical yearbook; 
Beijing, 1998). 
“Estimates  by the China State Statistics Bureau. 242  Shang-Jin Wei 
since 1995, China received more FDI than any other country except the 
United States. 
The recent Asian financial crisis has lowered the official estimate of the 
inward flow of FDI in 1997 to $37 billion (another estimate forecasts mod- 
est growth over the 1996 number, to $45.3 billion). The 1998 inward flow 
is forecast to stay at the 1997 level. 
IMF  estimates are generally $3 to $5 billion (roughly 10 percent of the 
total) less than Chinese official statistics. One Chinese official during an 
interview with the author in March 1998 suggested that the market value 
of the shares in  Chinese companies floated in  the international market 
(mainly on the Hong Kong and New York Stock Exchanges) are counted 
as part of FDI. This, if  true, would be the first source of  false-foreign 
direct investment in the official statistics. While equity investment may be 
counted as direct investment in other countries if the investment implies 
foreign control of the company, in the Chinese case no company floated 
in the international capital market transfers control rights to foreign share- 
holders. In fact, the state typically maintains 51 percent or more nontrad- 
ing shares in the companies listed on domestic as well  as foreign stock 
markets. Even the shares bought by domestic investors do not entail con- 
trol rights over the management of the companies. So this amount should 
be subtracted from the official statistics on inward FDI, at least for re- 
cent years. 
To put inward FDI in the context of China’s overall participation in the 
international capital market, table 8.2 presents data on all forms of capital 
inflow into China over the period 1992-96.  Two features are worth noting. 
First, during the sample period, FDI has consistently been a more impor- 
tant source of foreign capital inflow than portfolio investment. Second, 
within the category of portfolio investment, loans from international com- 
mercial banks tend to be a small fraction of overall external loans, domi- 
nated by loans from foreign governments, international financial institu- 
tions, and export credits. These are significant because recent studies have 
suggested that a low ratio of FDI to portfolio inflow and a high ratio of 
short-term debt to overall foreign borrowing tend to be associated with a 
higher probability of currency crisis (Frankel and Rose 1996; Radelet and 
Sachs 1998). 
FDI takes one of the following four forms: joint ventures, contractual 
joint ventures, wholly owned foreign firms, and joint exploration (mainly 
for offshore oil). Joint ventures are by  far the dominant form of FDI, 
accounting for roughly half of all FDI throughout  the sample. Foreign 
wholly owned firms as a form of FDI are catching up fast, growing by 400 
percent cumulatively over the  1992-96  period, as compared to the 279 
percent growth rate for all FDI in the same period. 
Chinese statistics contain a third category of foreign capital aside from Why Does China Attract So Little Foreign Direct Investment?  243 
Table 8.2  Realized Foreign Capital Going into China, Including Loans and Direct 
Investment, 1992-96  (million US.  dollars) 
Inflow  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
Total 
External loans 
Loans from foreign 
governments 
Loans from international 
financial institutions 
Export credit 
Commercial bank loans 
Bonds and equity shares 
FDI 
Joint ventures 
Contractual joint ventures 


























































































Source: China Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFTEC), Almanac of  China? 
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (various issues). See also MOFTEC’s website: http://www.moftec. 
gov.cn/moftec/officiaI/html/statistics_dareign~capital.  html. 
loans and direct investment. This category, labeled “other foreign invest- 
ment” in table 8.2, includes three  subcategories: leasing, compensation 
trade, and export processing or assembly. The biggest part of the three, 
compensation trade, in which foreign firms provide machines or product 
designs to Chinese firms and obtain part of the output as compensation, 
is no longer as popular as at the beginning of the reform in early 1980s. 
In fact, this other foreign investment is small relative to FDI and has be- 
come ever less important. 
8.2.2  Source Country Composition of Foreign Direct Investment 
FDI in China has a very unusual composition of source countries. Ac- 
cording to the United  Nations, the world’s five most important source 
countries in terms of outflow during 1990-95 were the United States, Japan, 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and France. Collectively, they accounted 
for over 70 percent of all direct investment from developed countries. 
If one looks at who invests in China (table 8.3), one finds that Hong 
Kong is the dominant direct investor. Hong Kong’s annual inflow accounts Table 8.3  Source Country Distribution of FDI in China: Flow Data (million US.  dollars) 
















































































































































































Source: See table 8.2 source. Why Does China Attract So Little Foreign Direct Investment?  245 
for half or more of total FDI inflow into China for every year during the 
1992-96  period. Hong Kong’s dominance tends to be more important in 
earlier years. So if  one looks at the stock of FDI, Hong Kong’s share is 
close to 60 percent. Japan and the United States are the second and third 
largest investors in China (the relative ranking may switch between the 
two depending on the year examined). However, each invests significantly 
less than Hong Kong, typically less than a quarter of what Hong Kong 
invests. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany are important source 
countries. However, their investments not only lag distantly behind that of 
Hong Kong but sometimes also lag behind Singapore and Macao. 
One may question whether Hong Kong’s investment in mainland China 
should be counted as FDI. Ever since the founding of the People’s Repub- 
lic, the Chinese government consistently declared that it did not regard 
the various treaties that ceded or leased what is now the Hong Kong terri- 
tory to Britain as valid and legally binding. It claimed that Hong Kong 
was always part of  China. On 1 July 1997, Britain formally returned the 
territory to China. In that connection, one can at most treat investment 
coming from Hong Kong as quasi-foreign.’ 
Part of reported FDI from Hong Kong is in  fact capital originating 
from the mainland and coming back to the mainland disguised as Hong 
Kong investment-sometimes  labeled “round-tripping” capital-to  take 
advantage of tax, tariff, and other benefits accorded to foreign-invested 
firms. One estimate puts  round-tripping  capital at  15 percent  of  total 
Hong Kong investment in China in the Chinese official statistics. Round- 
tripping capital is best described as “false-foreign” direct investment. Us- 
ing the previous estimate, false-foreign investment was on the order of $3 
billion in 1996, or over 7 percent of the total FDI flow into China, ac- 
cording to the official statistics. 
To summarize, if one excludes false-foreign and quasi-foreign direct in- 
vestment in China, true FDI would be 50 percent smaller in terms of the 
flows in recent years, and 60 percent smaller in terms of the stocks. 
8.3  China as a Host of Direct Investment from 
the Major Source Countries 
I now examine whether China is an underachiever as a host of invest- 
ment from the world’s major source countries, and whether corruption 
1, Part of Hong Kong investment may be Taiwanese investment disguised to avoid political 
inconvenience with the Taiwanese government. If one adopts  the view  that Taiwan and 
China belong to the same country, which is the official position  of the two governments 
on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, then this part of investment should also be treated as 
quasi-foreign. 
Another part of Hong Kong investment may truly be investment from the world’s major 
source countries such as the United States and United Kingdom. This portion is not likely 
to be big. We will return to this discussion later in the paper. 246  Shang-Jin Wei 
has deterred foreign investment. Let me first explain the data, and then 
the specification of the statistical framework, before presenting and dis- 
cussing the results. 
8.3.1  Data 
Foreign Direct Investment 
The dependent variable is the bilateral stock of FDI at the end of 1993 
from seven major source countries to forty-two host countries. The data 
come from the OECD bilateral FDI database covering outward FDI by 
destination. They are based on reports by individual source countries. The 
source countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United King- 
dom, France, Italy, and Norway. These seven countries are the only source 
countries that have nonmissing data on FDI in China. The number of host 
countries is constrained by availability of data on corruption and taxes. 
From this database, table 8.4 presents the bilateral stock of FDI from 
these seven countries into China and Hong Kong in 1993, 1991, and 1989. 
Comparing tables 8.3 and 8.4, one notices discrepancies, sometimes quite 
large, in the bilateral FDI from the two reporting sources (also see appen- 
dix table 8A.1). The stock values of FDI in  1993 by  the United  States, 
Japan, and Italy according to source country reports in the OECD data- 
base were actually a lot smaller than thejlows of FDI from these countries 
in the same year according to Chinese (host country) statistics, sometimes 
by  a factor of three. The stock values of FDI in  1993 from the United 
Kingdom and France according to their reports to the OECD were close 
to the flow values reported by the Chinese. Stocks of FDI for Germany 
and Norway in 1993 were higher than the corresponding flows, and the 
two can plausibly be matched. 
There are reasons why the Chinese data may be overstated (related to 
bureaucrats’ incentives to exaggerate their ability to attract FDI and for- 
eign investors’ incentives to exaggerate their amount of investment in or- 
der to report lower taxable incomes). But there are also plausible reasons 
why  the OECD numbers may be understated (e.g., reinvested dividends 
may not be properly counted). Given that the Chinese reported flow in 
1993 was bigger for some countries than the entire stock in the same year, 
it seems likely that the Chinese figures contain much fat. 
In any case, in the interest of using a consistent database, all subsequent 
regressions are run using the OECD data. I will, however, discuss the im- 
plications of measurement errors for the interpretation of  the statistical 
results. 
Corruption Measure 
By its nature, corruption is very difficult if not infeasible to measure ob- 
jectively. Researchers have relied on corruption perception indexes based 
on surveys of  experts or firms. For example, the Business International Table 8.4  Bilateral Stock of FDI in China and Hong Kong 
China  Hong Kong 
Source Country  1993  1991  1989  1993  1991  1989  Unit 




Germany  734 
Italy  88 
Japan  6,163 
United Kingdom  183 
217.1 
United States  9 16.0 
5.7 









































































Sources; Unless otherwise noted, data in units of source country currency are from table 8: “Direct Investment Abroad: Position at Year-End by Country” 
in each source country section of OECD, International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook (Paris, 1996). U.S. dollar amounts for France, Germany, Italy, 
the United Kingdom, and Norway are converted using the end-of-year exchange rate from IMF, Internutional Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C., various 
issues), line ae. Japanese outward FDI is reported in million US. dollars in the OECD book. 248  Shang-Jin Wei 
(BI) index, based on surveys conducted during 1980-83, asked experts or 
consultants to rank the countries with which they worked according to 
“the degree to which business transactions involve corruption or question- 
able payments.” Mauro (1995) and Wei (1997a, 1997b) used it to examine 
the relations between economic growth and corruption and between FDI 
and corruption, respectively. Unfortunately, the BI index does not cover 
China in its sample. 
The corruption measure that I use in this paper is the Transparency 
International  (TI) index for  1988-92.  Transparency  International  is  an 
agency dedicated to fighting corruption worldwide. Its index is an average 
of four surveys of perception of corruption conducted during 1988-92.2 
Other corruption indexes are available. The International Country Risk 
Group (ICRG) index is another index based on surveys of experts or con- 
sultants. The Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) 1997 index is based 
on a survey of about 2,400 firms in fifty-eight countries. The pairwise cor- 
relations among the BI, TI, and GCR indexes are very high. For example, 
the correlation coefficient between the BI and TI (or GCR) indexes is .88 
(or .77). This gives one confidence that the statistical results I will present 
are not likely to be sensitive to the choice of index. To get a concrete idea 
of the corruption measure, table 8.5 reports the values of these corruption 
indexes for a selection of countries. 
Other Data 
For host country tax rate, I use the 1989 number because tax rates did 
not change very much over 1989-9 1. The actual measure is the minimum 
of two numbers: the statutory marginal tax rate on foreign corporations 
as reported by  Price Waterhouse3 (1 990) and the actual average tax rate 
paid by  foreign subsidiaries of American firms in that country. Data on 
twenty-eight of the host countries are taken from Desai and Hines (1996, 
app. 2). The rest were obtained using the Price Waterhouse source with 
the kind assistance of Mihir Desai. 
GDP  data come from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Inter- 
national Financial Statistics database. In a few cases where GDP data are 
not available, GNP data are substituted. Wage data are obtained from the 
International Labor Organization (1  995). 
Bilateral distance data measure “greater circle distances” between eco- 
nomic centers in source-host pairs. The dummy on linguistic tie takes the 
value one if the source and  host countries have a common language and  zero 
otherwise. Both sets of data were used in Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1995). 
2. The four surveys are Business International (1988); Political Risk Service, East Syra- 
cuse, New York (1988); World Competitiveness Report, Institute for Management Develop- 
ment, Lausanne (1992); and Political and Economic Consultancy, Hong Kong (1992). 
3. See Price Waterhouse website on corporate taxes around the world: http://www.i-trade. 
com/infosrc/pw/corptax/toc.htm. Why Does China Attract So Little Foreign Direct Investment?  249 
Table 8.5 
Country  TI 1988-92  TI  1997  BI 1980-83  GCR 1997 

















































































































Note: In the original Business International (BI), Transparency International (TI), Global 
Competitiveness Report (GCR) indexes, small numbers imply more corruption. All the in- 
dexes in the table have been rescaled so that large numbers imply more corruption. For the 
BI and TI  indexes, the values in the table are  11 minus the original scores; for the GCR 
index, the values in the table are 8 minus the original scores, times 10/7. 
“Regulatory burden” is a subjective measure from Freedom House. Its 
relatively small country coverage would reduce the sample size signifi- 
cantly in regressions that include it as a regressor. “Easy access to domes- 
tic capital markets” and “infrastructure efficiency” are subjective mea- 
sures from the Global Competitiveness Report 1996. 
8.3.2  Econometric Specification 
lowing sort: 
One could run an ordinary least squares (OLS) specification of the fol- 
lnFDIii = X$  + u,, 
where FDIy is the stock of foreign investment from source country i to 
host country j and Xis a vector of regressors including the host country’s 
GDP in logarithm and the distance between the source and host countries 
in logarithm. Experience indicates that, in analogy to the gravity specifi- 250  Shang-Jin Wei 
cation on trade flows, the logarithmic transformation of both sides of the 
equation (of the dependent variable and of most of the regressors), called 
the double-log linear specification, produces the best functional fit. 
Many host countries receive no direct investment from some source 
countries. A serious drawback of the double-log linear specification is that 
zero-FDI observations are dropped by  this specification. It is natural to 
think about using a Tobit specification to replace the OLS. The problem 
there is that the simple Tobit specification conflicts with the double-log 
transformation, because the log of zero is not defined. To deal with this 
problem, I will employ the following specification in this paper: 
ifXp +  u,  > lnA, 
ifXp +  uq I  lnA, 
1n(FDIu  +  A) =  Xp  +  u,, 
=  lnA, 
where A is a threshold parameter to be estimated and u is an i.i.d. normal 
variate with mean zero and variance u2. In this specification, if  Xp + u 
exceeds a threshold value, lnA, source country i accumulates a positive 
stock of investment in host country j;  otherwise, the realized foreign in- 
vestment is zero (and the desired level could be negative). I use the maxi- 
mum likelihood method  to estimate this equation.  Eaton  and Tamura 
(1996) pioneered a version of this specification. Wei  (1997a) provided a 
derivation of the likelihood function. 
In actual implementation, I will use a quasi-fixed-effects specification. 
That is, all regressions will include source country dummies, which take 
care of all source-country-specific characteristics such as size, level of de- 
velopment, propensity to invest abroad, and possibly idiosyncratic defini- 
tion of outward FDI. Aside from source country dummies, the list of re- 
gressors will include various variables for host country characteristics and 
source-host pair characteristics. 
8.3.3  Regression Results and Interpretation 
Basic Findings 
Column (1) of table 8.6 provides a benchmark regression. Aside from 
source country dummies, the list of regressors includes corruption, mar- 
ginal tax rate, a dummy for the host country’s being an OECD member, 
two measures of the size of the host country (namely, GDP and popula- 
tion, both in logarithmic form),4 log distance between the economic cen- 
ters of the source and host countries, and a dummy for whether the source 
and the host have a common linguistic tie and a historical colonial tie. On 
4. One may prefer to include log GDP and log GDP per capita instead. The coefficients 
on these two variables would be a linear combination of the two coefficients on log GDP 
and log population. Table 8.6  China as a Host of FDI 
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Note:  Numbers in parentheses  are standard errors. All coefficients and standard errors have been 
multiplied by 1,000. All regressions include a constant and source country dummies whose coefficients 
are not reported. 
*Significantly  different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
"Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. 
""Significantly different from zero at the 15 percent level. 252  Shang-Jin Wei 
top of that, a dummy for China as host country is added to see whether 
China receives more or less FDI than predicted by the model. 
The coefficients on both corruption and tax rate are negative and statis- 
tically significant, indicating that more corruption or higher taxes tend to 
discourage foreign investment. The coefficients on log GDP and log pop- 
ulation are positive, significant, but less than one, suggesting that larger 
economies receive more FDI, although the increment in FDI is less than 
proportional to the increment in country size. The coefficient on log dis- 
tance is negative but insignificant. That on the linguistic dummy is positive, 
significant, and quantitatively large. 
The key variable of interest is the dummy for China as host country for 
FDI from these seven major source countries. The coefficient on this vari- 
able is  -1.15  and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. In other 
words, controlling  for  these  regressors,  China  is  a  significant  under- 
achiever as a host of FDI. The nonlinear nature of the specification pre- 
vents an intuitive interpretation of how much smaller FDI in China is rel- 
ative to its potential. But the quantitative effect is large. Taking the point 
estimates on the China dummy and the tax variable literally, one needs to 
raise the tax rate by 42 percentage points (= 1.15/0.0272) in order to re- 
duce FDI in a country that is otherwise identical to China (in terms of the 
values of the regressors) to the level that actually went into China in 1993. 
The relative quantitative effect of corruption on FDI is also significant. 
A one-step worsening in the TI corruption rating would be equivalent to 
raising the marginal tax rate by 4.78 percentage points (see Wei  1997a). 
An increase in the host country corruption rating from the Singapore level 
(TI value = 1) to the China level (TI index = 6) has the same effect on 
inward FDI as raising the tax rate by 23.9 percentage points (= 4.78  X 
5). In other words, (perceived) corruption in China is likely to have sig- 
nificantly discouraged FDI. 
The benchmark specification in column (1) of table 8.6 assumes that the 
effects of corruption and the tax rate are linear. In column (2), squared 
values of both corruption and the tax rate  are added to check for the 
presence of nonlinearity. Neither corruption nor corruption squared is sta- 
tistically significant, suggesting that there is no nonlinear effect from cor- 
ruption. On the other hand, tax squared does have a negative and signifi- 
cant effect, although the level effect becomes insignificant. The estimated 
coefficient on the China dummy remains negative (- 1.59) and statisti- 
cally significant. 
It is interesting to note that the coefficient on the host country popula- 
tion term is less than one. This suggests that while inward FDI increases 
with population size, it does so less than proportionally. 
To see a possibly nonlinear effect from host country population  size 
on inward FDI, in column (3) squared log population is included as an 
additional regressor. The coefficient on the China dummy does get smaller Why Does China Attract So Little Foreign Direct Investment?  253 
but remains negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
However, neither the log population variable nor its square has a statisti- 
cally significant coefficient. So in subsequent regressions, I will drop the 
squared term. 
In columns (4) and (5), log wage and an interactive term between log 
wage and the OECD dummy are added. Because wage data are missing 
for some host countries, this reduces the sample size quite a bit. In any 
case, the coefficient on log wage is negative, consistent with the idea that 
countries with low labor costs attract more FDI, but the effect is not statis- 
tically significant. In the regression reported in column (4), we also add a 
dummy for East Asian developing country host and an interactive term 
between the East Asia dummy and the corruption measure. The objective 
is to test the hypothesis that the effect of corruption on FDI is smaller for 
East Asian developing hosts. The coefficient on the interactive term is a 
small positive number but statistically insignificantly different from zero. 
Hence, East Asian exceptionalism with respect to the effect of corruption 
on FDI is not supported by the data.5 
Are American and Japanese Investors Diferent? 
I now look at whether American  and the Japanese investors react to 
host country corruption in ways that may differ from the response of aver- 
age OECD investors. Specifically, the United States has a unique law- 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977-that  prohibits its firms from 
bribing foreign officials. Violators can be fined or put in jail. Until very 
recently, the United States was the only major source country in the world 
that criminalized the act of bribing a foreign officiaL6 For many other 
major source countries, bribes paid to foreign officials not only are not 
illegal but in fact are tax deductible as legitimate business expenses. The 
uniqueness of the United States leads one to think that American firms 
may be particularly averse to corruption in foreign host countries.’ 
Japan, on the other hand, is said to have a culture of substantial “gift 
exchange” between firms and government officials even in the purely do- 
mestic context. This might translate into some comparative advantage for 
Japanese businesses in corrupt foreign countries. In other words, Japan 
may be less sensitive to foreign corruption than an average source country. 
Column (1) in  table 8.7 puts these hypotheses to the test. Two more 
variables are added to the basic specification: an interactive variable be- 
5. This agrees with the finding of Wei (1997a) on an earlier data set. 
6.  Britain claims to have a law that specifies the same thing. The law is apparently not en- 
forced. 
7. Hines (1995) found a negative association between the size of U.S. direct investment in 
a country and that country’s corruption rating according to the BI index. While finding that 
FDI in general is negatively related to host country corruption, Wei (1997a) did not find a 
statistically significant difference between American and other OECD investors. 254  Shang-Jin Wei 
Table 8.7  Are American and Japanese Fims  Special? 
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Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. All coefficients and standard errors have 
been multiplied by  1,000. All regressions include a constant and source country dummies 
whose coefficients are not reported. 
=In  col. (2), FDI into China has been multiplied by five. 
*Significantly  different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
"Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. 
""Significantly different from zero at the 15 percent level. 
tween the US. source country dummy and the corruption measure, and a 
similar interactive variable between the Japan source country dummy and 
the host country corruption measure. If American investors are more averse 
to foreign corruption than investors from an average source country, the 
coefficient on the first interactive variable should be negative and statisti- 
cally significant. If Japanese investors are less sensitive to foreign corrup- 
tion than investors from an average source country, one expects to find a 
positive and significant coefficient on the second interactive variable. Why Does China Attract So Little Foreign Direct Investment?  255 
The results reported in column (1) support the first hypothesis but not 
the second. In other words, American investors are more discouraged 
from investing in corrupt host countries than average investors. 
While the coefficient on the China dummy is still negative and signifi- 
cant, it is  noteworthy that its absolute value is  smaller than the corre- 
sponding coefficient in column (2) of table 8.6. In other words, taking into 
account American investors’ aversion to foreign corruption is a step to- 
ward understanding the gap between China’s actual reception of FDI and 
its potential as predicted by the model in columns (1) and (2) of table 8.6. 
Measurement Errors on FDI into China 
We  mentioned the possibility that FDI in China from the major source 
countries  may  be  underreported  in  the  OECD  database  (specifically, 
OECD numbers tend to be a lot smaller than the numbers China reports 
in its official statistics). Note that if  a particular OECD country adopts a 
definition of FDI that merely underreports its FDI abroad, it would under- 
report FDI to all destination countries by  the same or a similar factor, 
which would not explain the negative China coefficient here. Although there 
is no evidence to think so, let us assume that for some reason, FDI in 
China from the major source countries is underreported by a larger extent 
than is FDI in other countries. To  see if China’s underachievement as a 
host can be explained by this assumption, I conduct an entirely arbitrary 
exercise: I multiply all FDI in China by a factor of five while keeping FDI 
in other host countries intact and rerun the regression reported in column 
(1) of table 8.7. The results are reported in column (2) of table 8.7. 
As one might expect, the absolute value of the coefficient on the China 
dummy-a  measure of the gap between China’s actual inward FDI and 
its potential-declines  from 1.38 to 1.20. But multiplying actual FDI in 
China by  five is not enough: the gap is still negative and statistically sig- 
nificant at the 5 percent level. 
The Hong Kong Connection 
It is often remarked that Hong Kong is a mecca for FDI. It seems pos- 
sible that in part because investors from the major source countries loathe 
the corrupt situation on the mainland, they invest heavily in Hong Kong 
as a stepping stone toward or substitute for investing in mainland China. 
Indeed, part of Hong Kong investment in China may have been made on 
behalf of investors from the major source countries. 
We  examine this possibility. In column (1) of table 8.8, a dummy for 
Hong Kong as host country is added to the regression. As  one expects, 
the coefficient is positive (0.46) and statistically significant, indicating that 
Hong Kong is an overachiever as a host of FDI. 
To see if the Hong Kong connection helps to solve the puzzle of China’s 
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Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. All coefficients and standard errors have 
been multiplied by  1,000. All regressions include a constant and source country dummies 
whose coefficients are not reported. 
"In col. (2), FDI in Hong Kong is counted as a part of FDI in China. Hong Kong as a host 
country is excluded from the sample. 
col. (3), constructed FDI in China is FDI in Hong Kong, plus five times original FDI 
in China. 
'In  col. (4), constructed FDI in China is FDI in Hong Kong, plus twenty times original FDI 
in China. 
*Significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
'Significantly  different from zero at the 10 percent level. 
"'Significantly  different from zero at the 15 percent level. Why Does China Attract So Little Foreign Direct Investment?  257 
source countries as part of FDI in China from the same source countries 
and exclude from the regression those observations in which Hong Kong 
is a host. The results are presented in column (2) of table 8.8. While the co- 
efficient on the China dummy drops substantially (from -  1.52 to -  1.04), it 
remains negative and significant. 
In column (3) of table 8.8, I reconstruct bilateral FDI in China as origi- 
nal FDI in China as reported by the source countries multiplied by five, 
plus bilateral FDI in Hong Kong from the same source countries. The 
coefficient on the China dummy again drops (to -0.93)  but is still signifi- 
cantly different from zero. In column (4), I reconstruct yet again bilateral 
FDI in China, as FDI reported  by  the source countries multiplied by 
twenty, plus  actual  FDI in  Hong Kong.  The coefficient on the China 
dummy this time is statistically insignificant (although still negative). All 
of these experiments are completely arbitrary. They serve to show that the 
gap between actual FDI in China and potential FDI as defined by these 
regressions is enormous. 
Adding Regulatory Burdens and Other Factors to the Regressions 
As a final exercise, we  add host country labor cost, regulatory burden, 
ease of access to domestic capital markets by foreign-invested firms, and 
efficiency of  infrastructure  to the regressions. In  this exercise, FDI in 
Hong Kong is counted as a part of FDT  in China, but original FDI in 
China is not amplified. All four new variables have missing observations 
for some host countries, and therefore, the sample size is reduced. The re- 
sults are presented in table 8.9. 
When just log wage in the host country is added to the regression, in 
column (l), it has a negative coefficient that is statistically significant at 
the 10 percent level. When a measure of regulatory burden is added to the 
regression, reported in column (2), it has a statistically significant and nega- 
tive coefficient (-0.34).  It is noteworthy that the coefficient on the China 
dummy now becomes statistically insignificantly different from zero. 
In column (3),  an index for easy access to domestic capital markets by 
foreign-invested firms and another index for infrastructure efficiency are 
added. Neither is statistically significant. Indeed, both have wrong signs. 
The measure of  regulatory burden and the TI corruption index are posi- 
tively correlated (with a correlation coefficient of .6). Shleifer and Vishny 
(1 994) and Kaufmann and Wei (1  999) have argued that the burden of regu- 
lation is often imposed or maintained by corruption-prone officials to fa- 
cilitate the extraction of bribes. In that sense, the severity of the regulatory 
burden can be taken as an indirect measure of the severity of corruption. 
8.4  Concluding Remarks 
While the absolute value of FDI in China in recent years looks very im- 




















































































































Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. All coefficients and standard errors have 
been multiplied by  1,000.  All regressions include a constant and source country dummies 
whose coefficients are not reported. Constructed FDI in China is FDI in Hong Kong plus 
original FDI in China. 
*Significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
"Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. 
""Significantly different from zero at the 15 percent level. Why Does China Attract So Little Foreign Direct Investment?  259 
fraction (maybe 15 percent of  Hong Kong investment in China can be 
round-tripping mainland capital in disguise. This should be counted as 
false-foreign direct investment and should be deleted from statistics on 
FDI in China. 
The remaining part of Hong Kong investment in China should be re- 
garded as quasi-foreign direct investment, for Hong Kong has always been 
a special extension of China even under British rule and has since 1 July 
1997 been legally part of China. Taking out these two parts would reduce 
the annual flow of FDI into China in recent years by half, and the stock 
by  60 percent. 
Using cross-country data on bilateral stocks of FDI from the seven 
most important source countries in the world, one can estimate the poten- 
tial amount of inward FDI for a host country such as China. Compared 
with its model-predicted potential, China is found to be a significant un- 
derachiever as a host of FDI from the major source countries. The gap is 
huge. China’s relatively high corruption discourages FDI by a significant 
amount. The regulatory burden in China may be another important im- 
pediment that discourages investors from the major source countries from 
investing more in China. Appendix 
Table 8A.1  FDI Flow into China: Chinese versus Source Country Statistics 
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Comment  Mari Pangestu 
This interesting paper enriches our understanding of the many facets of 
FDI in China and in particular questions the perception of  China as a 
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“magnet” for FDI. Wei aims to show that the gap between actual FDI in 
China and the potential amount from major source countries is large- 
or, contrary to what is perceived, that China is an “underachiever” as a 
host country of FDI from major source countries due to its corruption 
and regulatory burden. 
However, the motivation for the paper, that is, why one should be con- 
cerned that China may be an underachiever with respect to FDI from 
source countries but  an overachiever with  respect  to  FDI from Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, Macao, and Singapore, is not obvious. One can postulate 
three possible reasons for concern. First is the quantity of FDI. The no- 
tion would be that China is not receiving enough FDI (after adjusting for 
Hong Kong investment that is “domestic”), whether measured as a short- 
fall between domestic savings and domestic investment or whether the 
quantity of FDI is small relative to the size of China. 
Second is the diversity of  FDI. If  investment is dominated by  Hong 
Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and Singapore, China may be too dependent on 
these sources. Such reasoning could be partly  political  and partly  eco- 
nomic. Economically speaking, the type of investment from these source 
countries could differ from that from major source countries. 
Related to the above point, a third reason is the notion that FDI from 
the major source countries is “different” from domestic investment and 
FDI from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and Macao. FDI from major 
source countries could be preferable for various reasons normally argued 
to be the benefits of FDI: technology transfer, management and technol- 
ogy spillovers, demand for greater transparency, competition, and access 
to export markets. It is not clear whether the FDI numbers included in 
this study cover all FDI in China or whether they exclude certain sectors 
such as oil and gas. This distinction is important because it is likely that 
FDI from the major source countries dominates some sectors, such as oil 
and gas and mining, where these countries are likely to have firm-specific 
advantages. 
The reason for investment from one set of source countries differing 
qualitatively from investment from another set is not self-evident. While 
the amount of domestic investment must be taken out of  Hong Kong 
investment  coming  into  China  because  of  round-tripping  and  stop- 
tripping-or  investment coming through  Hong Kong to avoid corrup- 
tion-should  be subtracted, is the remaining pure Hong Kong investment 
qualitatively not desirable? After all, there has been a lot of synergy be- 
tween Hong Kong and China, with the former having much higher tech- 
nological capability and the latter providing lower cost labor, land, and 
infrastructure, as well as a large market. Furthermore, it is not self-evident 
that stop-tripping happens mainly because of corruption. FDI destined 
for China might go through Hong Kong because Hong Kong is a major Why Does China Attract So Little Foreign Direct Investment?  263 
financial and service center, and many firms have their regional headquar- 
ters in Hong Kong. So FDI entering China through Hong Kong could be 
based on synergy with existing activities in Hong Kong and proximity to 
the financial center and other infrastructure. 
Once it is statistically established that FDI from major source countries 
in China is less than its potential, the results of the analysis could be im- 
proved by looking at which main factor explains the underachievement. 
Besides corruption and the other factors tested, it is possible that there 
are still other factors, such as lack of intellectual property protection and 
weak enforcement of contracts. 
The data used in the study are for 1993. It is possible that updating the 
data to 1994-96  would yield different results because there was consider- 
able outward investment from Japan in those years. Another way to push 
the analysis is to take China as a dummy compared with other countries 
as dummies-for  example, Indonesia, one of  China’s main competitors 
for FDI from major source countries. Is Indonesia more or less of an 
underachiever, and what are the explanatory factors for its greater or lesser 
underachievement? 
A final point: if  the result is that underachievement is due to China’s 
corruption and regulatory burden, then for the paper to be useful it should 
identify policy implications. For instance, China’s attractiveness as a big 
market and source of low-cost labor is marred by its corruption and regu- 
latory burden. Therefore, if the motivation is to increase FDI from major 
source countries for whatever reason, the priorities for policy would be to 
reduce corruption and the regulatory burden. Since it will take time for 
these policies to take effect, especially if corruption cannot be uprooted 
at once, it is also important to identify interim measures that can be intro- 
duced (e.g., one-stop administration of FDI and regulations facing for- 
eign investors). 
Comment  Akira Kohsaka 
In this paper Wei  examines the determinants of  bilateral FDI stocks in 
1993 from seven major OECD source countries to forty-two host econo- 
mies, including China and Hong Kong. He concludes that China was an 
“underachiever”  in  attracting FDI from the seven countries within the 
framework of his empirical model. In 1994, Wei presented a paper at the 
NBER-East  Asia Seminar on Economics in which he followed the same 
Akira  Kohsaka is professor of  economics in the Osaka  School of  International Public 
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line of argument by examining the determinants of FDI flows in the years 
1987-90  from five  OECD countries (Wei  1996). What is  the difference 
between the two papers? 
First, he now uses a statistically more sophisticated estimation method 
with  Tobit specification on  the  data  set.  Second, he  scrutinizes more 
deeply the determinants  of  FDI by  adding some explanatory variables 
related to the general business environment in the host economy; these 
include tax levels,  degree of  corruption, and  other factors. Third, even 
though he starts his analysis with mainland China (table 8.6), he ends 
up consolidating China with Hong Kong as a host economy (tables 8.8 
and 8.9). 
I sympathize with Wei’s goal of evaluating the accuracy of the popular 
view of China as a world magnet for FDI, and I find appealing the claim 
that China has in fact been an underachiever and can or will be a larger 
FDI absorber. As far as his analysis goes, however, I cannot help having 
a few reservations about his conclusion. 
Let me begin my argument from within his data set as well as his analyti- 
cal framework. To start, look at columns (2) and (3) of table 8.9. We find 
a significant negative effect of  regulatory burden on FDI on one hand 
and insignificant (and wrongly signed) tax and corruption variables on the 
other. This is not surprising because all of them could be positively cor- 
related one another, reflecting unfavorable general business environments 
in host economies. On top of that, we  must note that the China dummy 
becomes  insignificant,  though  negative,  which  suggests  that  FDI  to 
“China” by the OECD-7 does not deviate from what the model predicts, 
or that China is not an underachiever contrary to the author’s claim. 
I am not necessarily saying that his claim is negated by his own results, 
but I would like to suggest we  should be more careful in interpreting this 
series of his estimation results on two points. 
One point concerns missing explanatory variables. In addition to ordi- 
nary determinants of  FDI, such as those related to host economy size 
and physical and cultural distance between host and source countries, the 
author picks up variables related to general business environment in the 
host economy: taxation, corruption, wages, regulatory burden, access to 
domestic capital markets, and infrastructure efficiency. He could add oth- 
ers related to locational advantages and disadvantages. The problem is 
that these variables are more or less closely correlated with each other, and 
we  generally cannot tell which of them matters most and is  first to be 
tackled. Furthermore, this correlation problem is most serious with those 
variables based on subjective evaluations, such as corruption and regula- 
tory burden. 
The other point  concerns his enlarged definition of  China as a host 
economy that includes Hong Kong. The probable overstatement of FDI 
data  on  the  Chinese  side has  been  frequently mentioned  and  is  well Why Does China Attract So Little Foreign Direct Investment?  265 
known, This is because of the round-tripping of Chinese capital as well as 
the short-tripping of other foreign capital, that is, because of the very na- 
ture of Hong Kong as an entrep6t not only in goods but in capital flows. 
So one idea is to focus only on “direct” FDI by  the OECD countries to 
China. Yet once you add Hong Kong to greater China as a host of FDI, 
all the ambiguity and complexity revive. The business environments in the 
two economies were (and are) quite distinct. We cannot tell what portion 
of  FDI by  OECD countries was  meant  to reach China through  Hong 
Kong and what portion was intended for Hong Kong on its own. 
Now, I turn to general issues about Wei’s framework as well as his data 
set. The deficiency or overstatement of FDI in China has been frequently 
mentioned. But it cannot be denied that Hong Kong has been the largest 
source economy for FDI in China. Although it would be difficult to iden- 
tify the ultimate nationalities of Hong Kong capital invested in China, the 
fact that it does not matter is the raison d’&tre  of Hong Kong. Above all 
(except for round-tripping Chinese capital motivated by domestic distor- 
tions), as correctly put by  Deng Xiaoping, it does not matter who brings 
in capital but how. If this is the case, whether China is an under- or over- 
achiever might have policy implications worth probing, and then the ex- 
clusion of  Hong Kong as a source economy is  not justified except for 
reasons of data availability. 
As is well known, China became the largest FDI absorber among the 
developing economies as late as 1993. Until then, it had never been taken 
seriously as a significant absorber of  FDI. Apparently, before 1993, no 
one spoke of “China fever” (Economist, 1  March 1997, 38, U.S. edition) 
or “The world’s  strongest magnet” (Journal of  Commerce, 27  December 
1996, 3A). What can we  say about such comments with a data set of FDI 
stock figures in 1993? Probably not much. Rather, I would like to see what 
Wei will come up with on the basis of a more recent data set. If he finds 
again that China is underachieving as an FDI absorber, it would really be 
a surprise. 
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